In practical quantum key distribution system, the state preparation and measurement have statedependent imperfections comparing with the ideal BB84 protocol. If the state-dependent imperfection can not be regarded as an unitary transformation, it should not be considered as part of quantum channel noise introduced by the eavesdropper, the commonly used secret key rate formula GLLP can not be applied correspondingly. In this paper, the unconditional security of quantum key distribution with state-dependent imperfections will be analyzed by estimating upper bound of the phase error rate in the quantum channel and the imperfect measurement. Interestingly, since Eve can not control all phase error in the quantum key distribution system, the final secret key rate under constant quantum bit error rate can be improved comparing with the perfect quantum key distribution protocol.
Meanwhile, Bob applies perfect Hadamard transformation in the receiver's side, thus Alice and Bob can share the maximally entangled quantum state utilizing the EDP technology. Secondly, Alice applies perfect measurement with her maximally entangled quantum states, and Bob applies imperfect measurement with his entangled quantum states correspondingly, finally they can establish the raw key. Similar to Shor and Preskill's [4] security analysis, security of the practical QKD is equal to the virtual protocol with the EDP technology and imperfect measurement. Since the phase error introduced by Bob's imperfect measurement should not be controlled by Eve, we can get a much higher secret key rate correspondingly. The similar result has also been given by Renner et al. [19] [20] [21] , they proved that adding noise in the classical post processing can improve the secret key rate by considering that phase errors introduced in the post processing can not be controlled by the eavesdropper Eve [7] . Comparing with the security analysis given by Renner et al., the noise introduced by the imperfect device are precisely known by Eve, since the random encoding choice, the imperfection can not be corrected or controlled by Eve. Thus, the exactly known but can not be controlled imperfection is similar to adding noise as the security analysis model given by Kraus et al. [19, 20] .
SECURITY OF QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION WITH PERFECT STATES PREPARATION AND MEASUREMENT
Before introducing the method to analyze security of QKD with imperfect devices, security of QKD with perfect devices will be analyzed in this section. Suppose that Alice and Bob choose the polarization encoding QKD system in our security analysis, the standard prepare-and-measure QKD protocol will be introduced in the following section. In Alice's side, the classical bit 0 is randomly encoded by quantum states |0 o or |45 o , the classical bit 1 is randomly encoded by quantum states |90 o or | − 45 o . In Bob's side, he randomly choose rectilinear basis
o , | − 45 o } to measure the quantum state transmitted through the quantum channel. After Bob's perfect measurement and some classical steps of QKD (sifting, parameter estimation, error correction and privacy amplification), secret key bits can be shared between Alice and Bob.
Following the technique obtained by Shor and Preskill [4] , security of prepare-and-measure QKD protocol is equal to security of entanglement-based QKD protocol, which can be constructed by considering the corresponding prepareand-measure encoding scheme as shown in Fig.1 . (|00 AB + |11 AB ). After applying the Hadamard operation randomly to the second part of the pair, she sends Bob half of the pair. Bob acknowledges the reception of his state and applies the Hadamard operation randomly. In the security analysis, the most generally noisy channels we need to consider are Pauli channels. By considering Eve's eavesdropping in the Pauli channel, the quantum state about Alice, Bob and Eve is given by u,v,i,j
where H = 
Q ij , i, j ∈ {0, 1}means the probability of H i and H j matrix introduced by Alice and Bob respectively, which satisfies Q ij = 1 4 for Alice and Bob's randomly choice. After the sifting step, the case of i = j will be discarded. We trace out A 1 , B 1 and Eve's systems to get the following equation
There are bit errors and phase errors in the Pauli channel, all of errors are considered to be introduced by Eve in the security analysis. After transmitting through the quantum channel, the initially shared maximally entangled state can be transformed into Bell states as the following equation
If the maximally entangled pairs |π 1 is transformed into Bell state |φ 1 , there is no error can be introduced in the quantum channel. However, if the maximally entangled pairs |φ 1 is transformed into Bell states |φ 2 , |φ 3 and |φ 4 respectively, the bit error, phase error and bit phase error will be introduced by Eve correspondingly. Thus, the bit error rate and phase error rate can be given by
The bit error rate and phase error rate should be calculated when we analyze unconditional security of QKD. In practical QKD system, quantum bit error rate can be estimated after the parameter estimation step in the classical part of QKD protocol. The main difficulty in security analysis is how to estimate upper bound of the phase error rate.
Combining equations (3), (4) with (5), the phase error rate minus the bit error rate is
Thus, the phase error can be estimated by the bit error rate accurately in the perfect device case. Correspondingly, the final secret key rate can be given by
where, h is the binary entropy function. The maximal tolerated bit error rate in the quantum channel is 0.11 with equation (7), which has also been given by Shor and Preskill.
Since practical QKD devices always have some flaws, the photon state preparation and measurement are always imperfect in practical QKD realizations. In the most general case, the imperfection is state-dependent. For example, the deflection angle has slight differences between different wave plates in polarization based QKD system. Similar to the security analysis of QKD with perfect devices, we will give the security analysis of QKD with imperfect devices in this section by utilizing the EDP technology and imperfect measurement. We firstly give the model description about the imperfect states preparation and measurement, then we will prove that the imperfect measurement is equal to the perfect measurement adding the noisy processing in our security analysis, finally security of the virtual protocol will be analyzed combining with the imperfect measurement and EDP technology.
Device-independent imperfections description
Angular deviation of the practical device can be used for illustrating the state-dependent imperfection. In Alice's side, the classical bit 0 is randomly encoded by quantum states |α 1 o or |45 + α 2 o , while the classical bit 1 is randomly encoded by quantum states |90 + α 3 o or | − 45 + α 4 o , where α 1 , α 2 , α 3 and α 4 are security parameters for illustrating Alice's angular deviations. In Bob's side, he randomly choose the imperfect rectilinear basis {|β 1 o , |90 + β 3 o } or the imperfect diagonal basis {|45 + β 2 o , | − 45 + β 4 o } to measure the quantum state transmitted in the quantum channel, where β 1 , β 2 , β 3 and β 4 are security parameters for illustrating Bob's angular deviation. Since the random encoding and decoding choice, all of the imperfection can not be controlled or corrected by the eavesdropper, detailed illustration of the imperfect parameter can be given as in Fig. 2 .
FIG. 2:
The most general imperfect states preparation and measurement in practical QKD experimental realization, where α1, α2, α3 and α4 illustrates the imperfect states preparation, β1, β2, β3 and β4 illustrates the imperfect measurement.
If the security parameter can be satisfied with α 1 = α 3 , α 2 = α 4 , β 1 = β 3 and β 2 = β 4 , it will be the basis-dependent imperfection correspondingly.
Imperfect measurement
In practical QKD system with imperfect devices as illustrated in the previous subsection, Bob gets the classical bit 0 with the projective measurement operator |β Since the rectilinear basis and diagonal basis will be selected randomly, the quantum bit error rate introduced by the imperfect measurement can be given by 
From this calculation, we can get the result that the imperfect measurement will introduce bit flipping with the probability e bit1 . Comparing with the imperfect measurement, the perfect measurement will introduce the bit flipping with zero probability. In our security analysis, Alice and Bob should establish the maximally entangled pairs before applying the measurement, which means that the eavesdropper can only get the error bit information about the secret key through the imperfect measurement in Bob's side. Thus, we can simplify the imperfect measurement as the perfect measurement adding a noisy processing protocol, where the bit 0(1) will be transformed into 1(0) with the probability e bit1 .
Virtual EDP protocol
We propose the virtual protocol based on the EDP technology as in Fig. 3 .
FIG. 3:
Entanglement-based quantum key distribution protocol with imperfect devices. We introduce the third party A1, B1 in the new protocol, which can not be controlled by Alice, Bob and Eve respectively. In the first step, Alice and Bob share the maximally entangled pairs. In the second step, Alice applies the perfect measurement, Bob applies the perfect measurement and a noisy processing protocol to get the raw key.
The new protocol mainly contain two steps: the first step is considering the maximally entangled state |φ 1 to be shared between Alice and Bob. In the rectilinear basis case, the classical bit 0 is prepared by the quantum state 
o )|e 1 and transmits half of the perfect state to Bob, where
, |e 0 and |e 1 are Alice's auxiliary quantum states. If Alice want to transmit the state |0 o to Bob, the auxiliary quantum state |e 0 will be selected, and the practical quantum state
o will be transmitted in the quantum channel. Since all of the imperfect state can be analyzed similarly, the non-unitary matrix H A1 and I A1 can be used for illustrating the imperfect state preparation. In the receiver's side, Bob applies the unitary transformation H B1 or I B1 randomly, where H B1 = 
o } correspondingly, then Alice and Bob will share the raw key. Similar to the security analysis based on the prefect device, A 1 and B 1 can not be changed by Alice and Bob in our security analysis, it can not be changed by Eve simultaneously. However, A 1 and B 1 are permitted to share the imperfection information with Alice, Bob and Eve. In the virtual protocol, the state preparation and measurement is the same as the original practical QKD system. If the unconditional security of the virtual protocol can be proved, security of the practical QKD system can be proved naturally. By considering Eve's eavesdropping in the Pauli channel, the quantum state about Alice and Bob before the measurement can be given by u,v,i,j
After the sifting step, the case of i = j will be discarded. We trace out Eve, A 1 and B ′ 1 s systems, the density matrix about Alice and Bob can be given by
Suppose that Alice prepare maximally entangled quantum states |φ 1 N in her side. After the EDP protocol, Alice and Bob will share maximally entangled quantum states |φ 1 M , which can be illustrated as the following equation
where e bit and e phase are the quantum bit error rate and phase error rate between Alice and Bob by considering the EDP technology. Since the calculation of e bit and e phase are much difficulty, we will get the calculation result based on some special imperfect parameters and the Mathematic software. Additionally, Bob will apply the imperfect measurement with the perfect entanglement quantum state as illustrated in the imperfect measurement subsection, Alice will apply the perfect measurement with the perfect entanglement quantum state correspondingly. Considering the virtual protocol, the practical quantum bit error rate between Alice and Bob can be estimated by
this equation means that the practical quantum bit error rate can be divided into two cases (considering the EDP protocol and the perfect measurement in Alice's side and imperfect measurement in Bob's side respectively). The first case is considering the EDP protocol has the right bit, the measurement protocol has the error bit. The second case is considering the EDP protocol has the error bit, the measurement has the right bit respectively. We can estimate Eve's information through the whole bit error rate and the phase error rate in the first step. Finally, the secret key rate can be given by
the calculation of which is much complicated for the formula has too many security parameters, we will give some examples to illustrate how to use this secret key rate formula in practical QKD system. We give a simple example in the following, we suppose that the imperfect parameters in our security analysis are 
Finally, we can only get zero secret key rate utilizing equation (13) . In practical experimental realization, Eve can measure Alice's states in the same rectilinear basis with 0 bit error, and she will introduce the perfect man-in-themiddle attack without being discovered.
CALCULATION
To compare our security analysis with GLLP's security analysis, we will give the calculation result by considering the case which can not be analyzed by the GLLP formula in this section. We consider that the device has individual imperfections both in the transmitter's side and receiver's side respectively, which means quantum states in the same basis maybe have the different angular deviation. Precisely, we assume that the security parameters can be satisfied with α 1 = β 1 = β 2 = a, α 2 = α 3 = α 4 = β 3 = β 4 = 0. After some lengthy but not very interesting algebra, the bit error rate and phase error rate in the first step (Alice and Bob establish the maximally entangled quantum pairs with the EDP technology) can be calculated respectively as following equations, 
Equations (16) and (17) can be directly calculated combining equation (11) 
Utilizing equation (8), we can get the bit error rate e bit1 as the following equation
Combining equations (12) , (13) with (20), we can get the final secret key rate formula as the following equation Final secret key rate with perfect and imperfect devices. The blue line means the perfect devices case, which can be satisfied with equation (7). The red line means security of imperfect devices by considering parameters α1 = β1 = β2 = 0.2, α2 = α3 = α4 = β3 = β4 = 0.
CONCLUSIONS
In practical quantum key distribution realizations, the state-dependent imperfection in Alice and Bob's side can not be satisfied with the GLLP formula. A simple security proof of QKD with state-dependent imperfect states preparation and measurement have been analyzed in this paper. Our security analysis result shows that the imperfect QKD system maybe tolerate much higher quantum bit error rate comparing with the previous security analysis.
